Management & BusinessSystematic Review
ESG and Corporate Governance โ The Greenwashing Problem That Auditors Are Starting to Catch
ESG reporting is nearly universal among large firms, but the gap between disclosure and practice is widening. Studies show ESG washing erodes legitimacy, causes rating divergence, and is increasingly flagged through audit scrutiny. Board diversity emerges as a key moderator.
By ORAA Research
This blog summarizes research trends based on published paper abstracts. Specific numbers or findings may contain inaccuracies. For scholarly rigor, always consult the original papers cited in each post.
The ESG reporting ecosystem has reached an awkward maturity. Nearly every major listed company publishes some form of environmental, social, and governance disclosure. Rating agencies proliferate. Regulatory mandates expand. But a growing body of research suggests that the quantity of ESG reporting has outpaced its qualityโand that the gap between what companies disclose and what they actually do is creating systemic risks for investors, regulators, and the firms themselves.
The term for this gap is greenwashing, and the 2024โ2025 literature offers increasingly sophisticated analyses of how it works, what damage it causes, and how governance mechanisms might detect or prevent it.
The Research Landscape
Legitimacy Erosion
Liang and Gao (2025), with 9 citations, provide a compelling analysis of how greenwashing damages firms through organizational legitimacy erosion. Studying public health firms in China during the country's pursuit of "dual carbon" objectives, they find that the relationship between greenwashing and financial performance is mediated by legitimacy loss. The mechanism works as follows: firms that inflate their environmental credentials initially benefit from stakeholder approval, but when the gap between disclosure and performance is detectedโby regulators, media, or watchdog organizationsโthe legitimacy backlash exceeds the initial benefit.
The key finding: greenwashing is not a costless strategy even when it goes undetected, because it creates organizational vulnerability. Firms that greenwash must maintain the fiction, which requires escalating disclosure without corresponding investment, eventually making detection more likely. The authors describe this as a "legitimacy debt" that compounds over time.
ESG Rating Divergence
Chen, Liu, and Zhang (2025), also with 9 citations, examine a downstream consequence of greenwashing: ESG rating divergence across rating agencies. When companies engage in strategic ESG disclosureโemphasizing favorable dimensions while obscuring unfavorable onesโdifferent rating agencies, each with their own methodology and weighting, produce divergent scores for the same firm. The authors call this "ESG washing" to distinguish it from simple greenwashing (environmental claims specifically) and find that greater ESG washing is associated with greater rating divergence.
This has practical implications for investors. If ESG ratings are supposed to guide capital allocation toward sustainable firms, but greenwashing makes those ratings unreliable, then the entire ESG investment thesis has a measurement problem at its foundation. The study uses Chinese A-share listed company data from 2009โ2022, providing a long time series.
Auditor Scrutiny
Sulaiman, Ardianto, and Anridho (2025) introduce an encouraging development: auditors are starting to catch the problem. The study examines the relationship between ESG performance and Key Audit Matters (KAMs) in ASEAN countries that have adopted ISA 701. Firms with higher ESG disclosures receive more KAM attention from auditorsโbut critically, this effect is moderated by greenwashing. Firms suspected of greenwashing receive disproportionately more audit scrutiny, suggesting that auditors are developing sensitivity to the gap between ESG claims and underlying realities.
This is a meaningful institutional development. If audit processes can flag greenwashing, it creates an accountability mechanism that supplements (and may be more effective than) voluntary ESG rating agencies.
Board Diversity as a Governance Mechanism
Two studies examine whether governance structuresโparticularly board diversityโmoderate ESG outcomes. Elgharabawy and Aladwey (2025), studying FTSE 350 companies from 2017โ2023, find that firms with higher ESG performance and greater board diversity are less likely to engage in tax avoidanceโa finding that connects ESG sincerity to broader corporate behavior. The implication is that ESG is not an isolated reporting exercise but a signal of governance quality.
Alotaibi and Al-Dubai (2024), with 18 citations, provide broader evidence that board diversity positively impacts both ESG performance and corporate profitability. Their study uses a larger cross-national sample and finds that the diversity-ESG relationship is stronger for the social and governance pillars than for the environmental pillar, suggesting that diverse boards are better at stakeholder management than at technical environmental strategy.
Critical Analysis: Claims and Evidence
<
| Claim | Evidence | Verdict |
|---|
| Greenwashing erodes organizational legitimacy over time | Liang & Gao's mediation analysis | โ
Supported โ coherent mechanism with empirical evidence |
| ESG washing causes rating divergence | Chen, Liu, & Zhang's longitudinal analysis | โ
Supported โ large sample, 13-year time series |
| Auditors are flagging greenwashing through KAMs | Sulaiman et al.'s ASEAN study | โ ๏ธ Suggestive โ emerging pattern, regional sample |
| Board diversity reduces greenwashing | Elgharabawy & Aladwey; Alotaibi & Al-Dubai | โ ๏ธ Suggestive โ correlational, not causal |
| ESG performance signals broader governance quality | Multiple studies above | โ
Supported โ convergent finding across studies |
Open Questions
Detection tools: Can NLP-based tools systematically detect greenwashing in ESG reports, or does effective detection still require domain expertise and contextual judgment?Regulatory harmonization: With the EU's CSRD, the SEC's climate disclosure rules, and ISSB standards all evolving, will regulatory convergence reduce or increase greenwashing?The sincerity gap: How should researchers distinguish between firms that are genuinely improving but slowly (and thus have a gap between disclosure and performance) and firms that are strategically misrepresenting?Board diversity mechanisms: Is the board diversityโESG relationship driven by cognitive diversity (different perspectives) or by demographic representation (signaling to stakeholders)?Investor response: Do investors price greenwashing risk, or do they continue to treat ESG ratings at face value?What This Means
The ESG ecosystem is entering a correction phase where disclosure quantity is being scrutinized for disclosure quality. For firms, the implication is that greenwashing carries increasing risk as detection mechanismsโauditors, rating divergence analysis, regulatory enforcementโbecome more sophisticated. For investors, ESG rating divergence means that reliance on any single rating is risky. For governance scholars, the audit-as-detection finding opens a productive research agenda at the intersection of auditing and sustainability.
Explore related work through ORAA ResearchBrain.
๋ฉด์ฑ
์กฐํญ: ์ด ๊ฒ์๋ฌผ์ ์ ๋ณด ์ ๊ณต ๋ชฉ์ ์ ์ฐ๊ตฌ ๋ํฅ ๊ฐ์์ด๋ค. ํ์ ์ฐ๊ตฌ์์ ์ธ์ฉํ๊ธฐ ์ ์ ๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์ธ ์ฐ๊ตฌ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ํต๊ณ ๋ฐ ์ฃผ์ฅ์ ์๋ฌธ ๋
ผ๋ฌธ๊ณผ ๋์กฐํ์ฌ ๊ฒ์ฆํด์ผ ํ๋ค.
ESG์ ๊ธฐ์
์ง๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ โ ๊ฐ์ฌ์ธ๋ค์ด ํฌ์ฐฉํ๊ธฐ ์์ํ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ ๋ฌธ์
ESG ๋ณด๊ณ ์ํ๊ณ๋ ์ด์ํ ์ฑ์ ๋จ๊ณ์ ๋๋ฌํ๋ค. ์ฃผ์ ์์ฅ ๊ธฐ์
๋๋ถ๋ถ์ด ์ด๋ค ํํ๋ก๋ ํ๊ฒฝยท์ฌํยท์ง๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ๊ณต์๋ฅผ ๋ฐํํ๋ค. ์ ์ฉํ๊ฐ๊ธฐ๊ด์ ์ฆ๊ฐํ๊ณ ์์ผ๋ฉฐ, ๊ท์ ์๋ฌด๋ ํ๋๋๊ณ ์๋ค. ๊ทธ๋ฌ๋ ์ ์ ๋ ๋ง์ ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ค์ด ESG ๋ณด๊ณ ์ ์์ด ์ง์ ์์ง๋ ์ผ๋ฉฐ, ๊ธฐ์
์ด ๊ณต์ํ๋ ๋ด์ฉ๊ณผ ์ค์ ๋ก ํ๋ ์ผ ์ฌ์ด์ ๊ฐ๊ทน์ด ํฌ์์, ๊ท์ ๋น๊ตญ, ๊ธฐ์
์์ฒด์ ๋ํด ์์คํ
์ ์ํ์ ์ด๋ํ๊ณ ์์์ ์์ฌํ๋ค.
์ด๋ฌํ ๊ฐ๊ทน์ ์ง์นญํ๋ ์ฉ์ด๊ฐ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ(greenwashing)์ด๋ฉฐ, 2024โ2025๋
๋ฌธํ์ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ด ์ด๋ป๊ฒ ์๋ํ๋์ง, ์ด๋ค ํผํด๋ฅผ ์ ๋ฐํ๋์ง, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ ์ง๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ์ด ์ด๋ฅผ ์ด๋ป๊ฒ ํ์งํ๊ฑฐ๋ ๋ฐฉ์งํ ์ ์๋์ง์ ๋ํ ์ ์ ๋ ์ ๊ตํ ๋ถ์์ ์ ์ํ๊ณ ์๋ค.
์ฐ๊ตฌ ํํฉ
์ ๋น์ฑ ์นจ์
9ํ ํผ์ธ์ฉ๋ Liang and Gao(2025)๋ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ด ์กฐ์ง ์ ๋น์ฑ(organizational legitimacy) ์นจ์์ ํตํด ๊ธฐ์
์ ํผํด๋ฅผ ์
ํ๋ ๋ฐฉ์์ ๋ํ ์ค๋๋ ฅ ์๋ ๋ถ์์ ์ ๊ณตํ๋ค. ์ค๊ตญ์ "์ด์ค ํ์(dual carbon)" ๋ชฉํ ์ถ์ง ๊ธฐ๊ฐ ๋์ ๊ณต์ค ๋ณด๊ฑด ๊ธฐ์
๋ค์ ์ฐ๊ตฌํ ์ด๋ค์, ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ๊ณผ ์ฌ๋ฌด ์ฑ๊ณผ ์ฌ์ด์ ๊ด๊ณ๊ฐ ์ ๋น์ฑ ์์ค์ ์ํด ๋งค๊ฐ๋๋ค๋ ๊ฒ์ ๋ฐ๊ฒฌํ๋ค. ๊ทธ ๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ์ ๋ค์๊ณผ ๊ฐ์ด ์๋ํ๋ค: ํ๊ฒฝ์ ์ ๋ขฐ๋๋ฅผ ๋ถํ๋ฆฐ ๊ธฐ์
์ ์ด๊ธฐ์ ์ดํด๊ด๊ณ์ ์น์ธ์ผ๋ก๋ถํฐ ์ด์ต์ ์ป์ง๋ง, ๊ณต์์ ์ค์ ์ฑ๊ณผ ์ฌ์ด์ ๊ฐ๊ทน์ด ๊ท์ ๋น๊ตญ, ์ธ๋ก , ๋๋ ๊ฐ์ ๋จ์ฒด์ ์ํด ํ์ง๋๋ฉด ์ ๋น์ฑ ๋ฐ๋ฐ(legitimacy backlash)์ด ์ด๊ธฐ ์ด์ต์ ์ด๊ณผํ๋ค.
ํต์ฌ ๋ฐ๊ฒฌ: ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ์ ๋ฐ๋์ง ์๋๋ผ๋ ๋น์ฉ ์๋ ์ ๋ต์ด ์๋๋ค. ์ด๋ ์กฐ์ง์ ์ทจ์ฝ์ฑ์ ๋ง๋ค์ด๋ด๊ธฐ ๋๋ฌธ์ด๋ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ํ๋ ๊ธฐ์
์ ํ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์ ์งํด์ผ ํ๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋ ์ด์ ์์ํ๋ ํฌ์ ์์ด ๊ณต์๋ฅผ ๊ณ์ ํ๋ํด์ผ ํจ์ ์๋ฏธํ๊ณ , ๊ฒฐ๊ตญ ํ์ง ๊ฐ๋ฅ์ฑ์ ๋์ธ๋ค. ์ ์๋ค์ ์ด๋ฅผ ์๊ฐ์ด ์ง๋จ์ ๋ฐ๋ผ ๋ณต๋ฆฌ๋ก ๋์ ๋๋ "์ ๋น์ฑ ๋ถ์ฑ(legitimacy debt)"๋ก ๋ฌ์ฌํ๋ค.
ESG ๋ฑ๊ธ ๋ถ์ฐ
์ญ์ 9ํ ํผ์ธ์ฉ๋ Chen, Liu, and Zhang(2025)์ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ํ๋ฅ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ(downstream consequence)์ธ ์ ์ฉํ๊ฐ๊ธฐ๊ด ๊ฐ ESG ๋ฑ๊ธ ๋ถ์ฐ์ ๊ฒํ ํ๋ค. ๊ธฐ์
์ด ์ ๋ฆฌํ ์ฐจ์์ ๊ฐ์กฐํ๊ณ ๋ถ๋ฆฌํ ์ฐจ์์ ์ํํ๋ ๋ฐฉ์์ผ๋ก ์ ๋ต์ ESG ๊ณต์์ ๊ด์ฌํ ๊ฒฝ์ฐ, ๊ฐ๊ธฐ ๋ค๋ฅธ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ๋ก ๊ณผ ๊ฐ์ค์น๋ฅผ ๋ณด์ ํ ๊ฐ ์ ์ฉํ๊ฐ๊ธฐ๊ด์ ๋์ผํ ๊ธฐ์
์ ๋ํด ์์ดํ ์ ์๋ฅผ ์ฐ์ถํ๋ค. ์ ์๋ค์ ์ด๋ฅผ ๋จ์ํ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ(๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์ผ๋ก ํ๊ฒฝ ๊ด๋ จ ์ฃผ์ฅ)๊ณผ ๊ตฌ๋ณํ๊ธฐ ์ํด "ESG ์์ฑ(ESG washing)"์ด๋ผ ๋ถ๋ฅด๋ฉฐ, ESG ์์ฑ์ด ์ฌํ ์๋ก ๋ฑ๊ธ ๋ถ์ฐ์ด ๋ ํฌ๋ค๋ ๊ฒ์ ๋ฐ๊ฒฌํ๋ค.
์ด๋ ํฌ์์๋ค์๊ฒ ์ค์ง์ ์ธ ์์ฌ์ ์ ๊ฐ์ง๋ค. ESG ๋ฑ๊ธ์ด ์ง์ ๊ฐ๋ฅํ ๊ธฐ์
์ผ๋ก์ ์๋ณธ ๋ฐฐ๋ถ์ ์๋ดํด์ผ ํ๋๋ฐ, ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ผ๋ก ์ธํด ํด๋น ๋ฑ๊ธ์ ์ ๋ขฐ์ฑ์ด ํผ์๋๋ค๋ฉด, ESG ํฌ์ ๋
ผ๊ฑฐ(thesis) ์ ์ฒด๊ฐ ๊ทธ ํ ๋์ ์ธก์ ๋ฌธ์ ๋ฅผ ์๊ณ ์๋ ๊ฒ์ด๋ค. ์ด ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ 2009โ2022๋
์ค๊ตญ A์ฃผ ์์ฅ ๊ธฐ์
๋ฐ์ดํฐ๋ฅผ ์ฌ์ฉํ์ฌ ์ฅ๊ธฐ ์๊ณ์ด์ ์ ๊ณตํ๋ค.
๊ฐ์ฌ์ธ์ ๋ฉด๋ฐํ ๊ฒํ
Sulaiman, Ardianto, and Anridho(2025)๋ ๊ณ ๋ฌด์ ์ธ ๋ฐ์ ์ ์๊ฐํ๋ค: ๊ฐ์ฌ์ธ๋ค์ด ๋ฌธ์ ๋ฅผ ํฌ์ฐฉํ๊ธฐ ์์ํ๊ณ ์๋ค. ์ด ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ ISA 701์ ์ฑํํ ASEAN ๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ค์์ ESG ์ฑ๊ณผ์ ํต์ฌ๊ฐ์ฌ์ฌํญ(Key Audit Matters, KAMs) ์ฌ์ด์ ๊ด๊ณ๋ฅผ ๊ฒํ ํ๋ค. ESG ๊ณต์ ์์ค์ด ๋์ ๊ธฐ์
์ผ์๋ก ๊ฐ์ฌ์ธ์ผ๋ก๋ถํฐ ๋ ๋ง์ KAM ์ฃผ๋ชฉ์ ๋ฐ๋๋ค. ๊ทธ๋ฌ๋ ๊ฒฐ์ ์ ์ผ๋ก ์ด ํจ๊ณผ๋ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ์ํด ์กฐ์ ๋๋ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ด ์์ฌ๋๋ ๊ธฐ์
์ ๋ถ๊ท ํ์ ์ผ๋ก ๋ ๋ง์ ๊ฐ์ฌ ๋ฉด๋ฐ ๊ฒํ ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ์ผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋ ๊ฐ์ฌ์ธ๋ค์ด ESG ์ฃผ์ฅ๊ณผ ๊ธฐ์ ํ์ค ์ฌ์ด์ ๊ฐ๊ทน์ ๋ํ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ๋๋ฅผ ๋ฐ์ ์ํค๊ณ ์์์ ์์ฌํ๋ค.
์ด๋ ์๋ฏธ ์๋ ์ ๋์ ๋ฐ์ ์ด๋ค. ๊ฐ์ฌ ํ๋ก์ธ์ค๊ฐ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ํ์๋ฅผ ๋ฌ ์ ์๋ค๋ฉด, ์๋ฐ์ ESG ์ ์ฉํ๊ฐ๊ธฐ๊ด์ ๋ณด์ํ๋(๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ ๋ณด๋ค ํจ๊ณผ์ ์ผ ์ ์๋) ์ฑ
์ ๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ์ด ๋ง๋ค์ด์ง๋ค.
์ง๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ์ผ๋ก์์ ์ด์ฌํ ๋ค์์ฑ
๋ ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ ์ง๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐโํนํ ์ด์ฌํ ๋ค์์ฑโ๊ฐ ESG ์ฑ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ์กฐ์ ํ๋์ง๋ฅผ ๊ฒํ ํ๋ค. Elgharabawy์ Aladwey(2025)๋ 2017๋
๋ถํฐ 2023๋
๊น์ง FTSE 350 ๊ธฐ์
์ ๋์์ผ๋ก ์ฐ๊ตฌํ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ESG ์ฑ๊ณผ๊ฐ ๋๊ณ ์ด์ฌํ ๋ค์์ฑ์ด ํด์๋ก ์กฐ์ธ ํํผ์ ์ฐธ์ฌํ ๊ฐ๋ฅ์ฑ์ด ๋ฎ๋ค๋ ์ฌ์ค์ ๋ฐ๊ฒฌํ์ผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋ ESG์ ์ง์ ์ฑ์ ๋ ๋์ ๊ธฐ์
ํ๋๊ณผ ์ฐ๊ฒฐํ๋ ๋ฐ๊ฒฌ์ด๋ค. ์ด๋ฌํ ํจ์๋ ESG๊ฐ ๊ณ ๋ฆฝ๋ ๋ณด๊ณ ํ๋์ด ์๋๋ผ ์ง๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ํ์ง์ ์ ํธ๋ผ๋ ๊ฒ์ด๋ค.
18ํ ์ธ์ฉ๋ Alotaibi์ Al-Dubai(2024)๋ ์ด์ฌํ ๋ค์์ฑ์ด ESG ์ฑ๊ณผ์ ๊ธฐ์
์์ต์ฑ ๋ชจ๋์ ๊ธ์ ์ ์ธ ์ํฅ์ ๋ฏธ์น๋ค๋ ๊ด๋ฒ์ํ ์ฆ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผ ์ ์ํ๋ค. ์ด๋ค์ ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ ๋ ํฐ ๊ท๋ชจ์ ๋ค๊ตญ๊ฐ ํ๋ณธ์ ํ์ฉํ๋ฉฐ, ๋ค์์ฑ-ESG ๊ด๊ณ๊ฐ ํ๊ฒฝ ๋ถ๋ฌธ๋ณด๋ค ์ฌํ ๋ฐ ์ง๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ๋ถ๋ฌธ์์ ๋ ๊ฐํ๊ฒ ๋ํ๋จ์ ๋ฐ๊ฒฌํ๋ค. ์ด๋ ๋ค์ํ ์ด์ฌํ๊ฐ ๊ธฐ์ ์ ํ๊ฒฝ ์ ๋ต๋ณด๋ค ์ดํด๊ด๊ณ์ ๊ด๋ฆฌ์ ๋ ๋ฅ์ํจ์ ์์ฌํ๋ค.
๋นํ์ ๋ถ์: ์ฃผ์ฅ๊ณผ ์ฆ๊ฑฐ
<
| ์ฃผ์ฅ | ์ฆ๊ฑฐ | ํ์ |
|---|
| ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ์๊ฐ์ด ์ง๋จ์ ๋ฐ๋ผ ์กฐ์ง์ ์ ๋น์ฑ์ ์นจ์ํ๋ค | Liang & Gao์ ๋งค๊ฐ ๋ถ์ | โ
์ง์ง๋จ โ ๊ฒฝํ์ ์ฆ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ์ถ ์ผ๊ด๋ ๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ |
| ESG ์์ฑ์ ๋ฑ๊ธ ๊ดด๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ์ ๋ฐํ๋ค | Chen, Liu, & Zhang์ ์ข
๋จ ๋ถ์ | โ
์ง์ง๋จ โ ๋๊ท๋ชจ ํ๋ณธ, 13๋
์๊ณ์ด |
| ๊ฐ์ฌ์ธ์ KAM์ ํตํด ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ํฌ์ฐฉํ๊ณ ์๋ค | Sulaiman ์ธ์ ASEAN ์ฐ๊ตฌ | โ ๏ธ ์์ฌ์ โ ์ ํฅ ํจํด, ์ง์ญ ํ๋ณธ |
| ์ด์ฌํ ๋ค์์ฑ์ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ๊ฐ์์ํจ๋ค | Elgharabawy & Aladwey; Alotaibi & Al-Dubai | โ ๏ธ ์์ฌ์ โ ์ธ๊ณผ๊ด๊ณ๊ฐ ์๋ ์๊ด๊ด๊ณ |
| ESG ์ฑ๊ณผ๋ ๋ ๋์ ์ง๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ํ์ง์ ์ ํธํ๋ค | ์์ ๋ค์ ์ฐ๊ตฌ | โ
์ง์ง๋จ โ ์ฌ๋ฌ ์ฐ๊ตฌ์ ๊ฑธ์น ์๋ ด์ ๋ฐ๊ฒฌ |
๋ฏธํด๊ฒฐ ๊ณผ์
ํ์ง ๋๊ตฌ: NLP ๊ธฐ๋ฐ ๋๊ตฌ๊ฐ ESG ๋ณด๊ณ ์์์ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ์ฒด๊ณ์ ์ผ๋ก ํ์งํ ์ ์๋๊ฐ, ์๋๋ฉด ํจ๊ณผ์ ์ธ ํ์ง์๋ ์ฌ์ ํ ๋๋ฉ์ธ ์ ๋ฌธ์ฑ๊ณผ ๋งฅ๋ฝ์ ํ๋จ์ด ํ์ํ๊ฐ?๊ท์ ์กฐํ: EU์ CSRD, SEC์ ๊ธฐํ ๊ณต์ ๊ท์น, ISSB ๊ธฐ์ค์ด ๋ชจ๋ ์งํํ๋ ๊ฐ์ด๋ฐ, ๊ท์ ์๋ ด์ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ๊ฐ์์ํฌ ๊ฒ์ธ๊ฐ, ์๋๋ฉด ์ฆ๊ฐ์ํฌ ๊ฒ์ธ๊ฐ?์ง์ ์ฑ ๊ฒฉ์ฐจ: ์ฐ๊ตฌ์๋ค์ ์ง์ ์ผ๋ก ๊ฐ์ ๋๊ณ ์์ง๋ง ์๋๊ฐ ๋๋ฆฐ ๊ธฐ์
(๋ฐ๋ผ์ ๊ณต์์ ์ฑ๊ณผ ์ฌ์ด์ ๊ฒฉ์ฐจ๊ฐ ์กด์ฌํ๋)๊ณผ ์ ๋ต์ ์ผ๋ก ํ์ ํ์ํ๋ ๊ธฐ์
์ ์ด๋ป๊ฒ ๊ตฌ๋ณํด์ผ ํ๋๊ฐ?์ด์ฌํ ๋ค์์ฑ ๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ: ์ด์ฌํ ๋ค์์ฑ-ESG ๊ด๊ณ๋ ์ธ์ง์ ๋ค์์ฑ(๋ค์ํ ๊ด์ )์ ์ํด ์ฃผ๋๋๋๊ฐ, ์๋๋ฉด ์ธ๊ตฌํต๊ณํ์ ๋ํ์ฑ(์ดํด๊ด๊ณ์์ ๋ํ ์ ํธ)์ ์ํด ์ฃผ๋๋๋๊ฐ?ํฌ์์ ๋ฐ์: ํฌ์์๋ค์ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ ์ํ์ ๊ฐ๊ฒฉ์ ๋ฐ์ํ๋๊ฐ, ์๋๋ฉด ESG ๋ฑ๊ธ์ ์ก๋ฉด ๊ทธ๋๋ก ๊ณ์ ์ทจ๊ธํ๋๊ฐ?์์ฌ์
ESG ์ํ๊ณ๋ ๊ณต์์ ์์ด ๊ณต์์ ์ง ์ธก๋ฉด์์ ๋ฉด๋ฐํ ๊ฒํ ๋๋ ๊ต์ ๋จ๊ณ์ ์ง์
ํ๊ณ ์๋ค. ๊ธฐ์
์ ์์ด์, ๊ฐ์ฌ์ธ, ๋ฑ๊ธ ๊ดด๋ฆฌ ๋ถ์, ๊ท์ ์งํ ๋ฑ์ ํ์ง ๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ์ด ๋์ฑ ์ ๊ตํด์ง์ ๋ฐ๋ผ ๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์์ฑ์ ์ฆ๊ฐํ๋ ์ํ์ ์๋ฐํ๋ค๋ ํจ์๊ฐ ์๋ค. ํฌ์์์๊ฒ ์์ด์, ESG ๋ฑ๊ธ ๊ดด๋ฆฌ๋ ๋จ์ผ ๋ฑ๊ธ์ ์์กดํ๋ ๊ฒ์ด ์ํํจ์ ์๋ฏธํ๋ค. ์ง๋ฐฐ๊ตฌ์กฐ ํ์๋ค์๊ฒ ์์ด์, ๊ฐ์ฌ-ํ์ง ๋ฐ๊ฒฌ์ ๊ฐ์ฌ์ ์ง์๊ฐ๋ฅ์ฑ์ ๊ต์ฐจ์ ์์ ์์ฐ์ ์ธ ์ฐ๊ตฌ ์์ ๋ฅผ ์ด์ด์ค๋ค.
๊ด๋ จ ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ ORAA ResearchBrain์ ํตํด ํ์ํ ์ ์๋ค.
References (5)
[1] Liang, Y., & Gao, X. (2025). Greenwashing and financial performance in public health firms: the mechanism of organizational legitimacy erosion. Frontiers in Public Health, 13, 1565703.
[2] Chen, H., Liu, S., & Zhang, D. (2025). Corporate ESG Washing and ESG Rating Divergence: Evidence From China. Business Strategy and the Environment.
[3] Sulaiman, N. A., Ardianto, A., & Anridho, N. (2025). ESG performance and auditor scrutiny: does corporate sustainability drive more key audit matters? Asian Review of Accounting.
[4] Elgharabawy, A., & Aladwey, L. (2025). ESG performance, board diversity and tax avoidance: empirical evidence from the UK. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting.
[5] Alotaibi, K., & Al-Dubai, S. A. (2024). Board diversity impact on corporate profitability and environmental, social, and governance performance. Corporate Law & Governance Review, 6(2).