Trend AnalysisLaw & Policy
Cryptocurrency Regulation: Why Every Jurisdiction Is Making It Up as They Go
Over 130 countries are exploring CBDCs. Cryptocurrency exchanges operate across borders. And regulatory frameworks range from outright bans to full integration. Five papers reveal a global regulatory landscape that is fragmented, reactive, and struggling to keep pace with financial technology innovation.
By Sean K.S. Shin
This blog summarizes research trends based on published paper abstracts. Specific numbers or findings may contain inaccuracies. For scholarly rigor, always consult the original papers cited in each post.
The cryptocurrency regulatory landscape in 2025 resembles a patchwork quilt sewn by committee: El Salvador adopted Bitcoin as legal tender in 2021 but reversed this policy in early 2025 under an IMF agreement, while China banned all crypto transactions. The EU implemented the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) while the US struggles to pass comprehensive legislation. India imposed a 30% tax on crypto gains while keeping the underlying legal status ambiguous. And over 130 countries are exploring Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) as a state-controlled alternative to decentralized cryptocurrency.
The fragmentation is not accidental. It reflects genuine disagreement about what cryptocurrency isโa currency, a commodity, a security, a property right, or a technological artifactโand therefore which legal framework should govern it. Each classification produces different regulatory consequences, and no consensus has emerged.
The Taxation Challenge
Grijalva-Salazar, Caicedo-Mendoza, and Zรบรฑiga-Castillo (2025) provide a systematic review of cryptocurrency taxation and fiscal policy from 2020 to 2025. Taxation on cryptocurrency is becoming critical in global fiscal governance as digital assets exist outside of traditional regulatory constructs.
The review identifies several persistent challenges:
- Classification: Is a cryptocurrency transaction a capital gain, income, a barter exchange, or a currency conversion? The answer determines the tax rate and the reporting obligations.
- Traceability: Decentralized, pseudonymous transactions are difficult for tax authorities to monitor. While blockchain transactions are theoretically transparent, linking wallet addresses to taxable individuals requires investigative resources.
- Cross-border arbitrage: Crypto holders can shift their tax residence or route transactions through low-tax jurisdictions with minimal frictionโa form of tax arbitrage that is more accessible than traditional offshore finance.
- DeFi complexity: Decentralized finance protocols (staking, yield farming, liquidity provision) generate returns that do not map neatly onto existing tax categories.
CBDCs: The State Strikes Back
M.K.M., Aithal, and S.K.R.S. (2024) examine the impact of Central Bank Digital Currency for financial inclusion and sustainability. More than 105 countries were exploring CBDC as of the study, among which approximately 50 countries were in advanced phases of digital currency development.
CBDCs represent the institutional response to cryptocurrency's challenge: if private digital currencies threaten monetary sovereignty, the state will create its own digital currency. CBDCs are backed by sovereign currency, issued by central banks, and governed by monetary policyโpreserving the state's role in the financial system while adopting the technical architecture of digital payments.
The financial inclusion argument for CBDCs is compelling in developing countries: a state-issued digital currency accessible through mobile phones could reach unbanked populations that lack access to traditional banking infrastructure. India's digital rupee pilot, China's digital yuan deployment, and Nigeria's eNaira all target financial inclusion as a primary objective.
Mongolia: Defining "Legal Tender" in the Digital Age
Siilen (2025) examines a foundational legal question: what does "legal tender" mean when the tender is digital? In response to the rapid development of digital payment instruments such as cryptocurrencies and e-wallets, global central banks have started to research their own digital currency for the purpose of protecting national currency and ensuring financial stability.
The Mongolian case illustrates how a small, open economy navigates the tension between digital currency innovation and monetary sovereignty. Mongolia's legal framework, like most countries', defines legal tender in terms of physical currency. Extending legal tender status to a CBDC requires legislative changes that touch not only monetary law but contract law, tax law, and consumer protection law.
Pakistan: From Cash to Code
Amjad (2026) evaluates whether Pakistan's existing laws can support a future Digital Rupee or CBDC. Pakistan's cash-heavy economy is rapidly moving toward digital finance, driven by fintech growth and the State Bank of Pakistan's Raast instant payment system.
The study evaluates the legal infrastructure for digital currency in a country where formal banking penetration is low, mobile phone penetration is high, and the informal economy constitutes a significant portion of economic activity. The gap between digital ambition and legal infrastructure is substantial: Pakistan's payment system laws, banking regulations, and tax code were designed for a cash-based economy and require comprehensive updating to accommodate digital currency.
The Regulatory Imperative
Sardar and Sood (2024) argue that cryptocurrency regulation is an urgent necessity rather than a policy option. Among a lot of technological revolutions, money is also revolutionized, giving birth to digital currency. With the increase in popularity and use of virtual currencies, regulatory questions become increasingly pressing.
The paper surveys global regulatory approaches, from outright prohibition (China, Algeria, Bangladesh) through restricted permission (India, Russia) to full integration (Switzerland; El Salvador briefly adopted Bitcoin as legal tender 2021โ2025). The analysis reveals that regulatory approaches correlate with political regime type and economic structure more than with technological readiness or financial developmentโsuggesting that crypto regulation is as much a political choice as a technical one.
Claims and Evidence
<
| Claim | Evidence | Verdict |
|---|
| Global cryptocurrency taxation is converging toward a standard | Grijalva-Salazar et al. (2025): classification, traceability, and cross-border challenges persist | โ Refuted |
| CBDCs can promote financial inclusion in developing countries | M.K.M. et al. (2024): mobile-accessible digital currency can reach unbanked populations | โ
Supported (in principle) |
| Existing legal frameworks can accommodate digital currencies | Siilen (2025), Amjad (2026): legal definitions of "legal tender" require legislative updates | โ Refuted |
| Cryptocurrency regulation is primarily a technical challenge | Sardar & Sood (2024): regulatory approaches correlate with political regime and economic structure | โ Refuted (primarily political) |
Open Questions
Can CBDCs and private cryptocurrencies coexist? CBDCs provide state control; cryptocurrencies provide decentralization. Are these complementary or competing visions of digital money?How should DeFi protocols be regulated? Decentralized autonomous organizations with no legal entity, no geographic location, and no identifiable operator challenge every assumption of financial regulation.Will crypto regulation fragment or converge? The EU's MiCA provides a comprehensive framework that may influence other jurisdictions. But the US, China, and India are pursuing distinct paths.What are the privacy implications of CBDCs? Unlike cash (which is anonymous), CBDCs enable state monitoring of every transaction. How should privacy protections be designed into CBDC architecture?Implications
The cryptocurrency regulatory landscape is in a state of flux that is unlikely to stabilize soon. The technology evolves faster than law can follow, cross-border operation undermines national regulation, and fundamental disagreements about the nature of digital currency prevent consensus on classification.
For policymakers, the practical priority is not to get the perfect regulation right but to get workable regulation deployedโframeworks that can be adapted as the technology and market evolve. For researchers, the priority is empirical evaluation of existing regulatory approaches: which produce better outcomes for financial stability, consumer protection, innovation, and inclusion?
๋ฉด์ฑ
์กฐํญ: ์ด ๊ฒ์๋ฌผ์ ์ ๋ณด ์ ๊ณต ๋ชฉ์ ์ ์ฐ๊ตฌ ๋ํฅ ๊ฐ์์ด๋ค. ํ์ ์ฐ๊ตฌ์์ ์ธ์ฉํ๊ธฐ ์ ์ ๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์ธ ์ฐ๊ตฌ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ํต๊ณ ๋ฐ ์ฃผ์ฅ์ ์๋ณธ ๋
ผ๋ฌธ์ ํตํด ํ์ธํด์ผ ํ๋ค.
์ํธํํ ๊ท์ : ๋ชจ๋ ๊ตญ๊ฐ๊ฐ ์ฆํฅ์ ์ผ๋ก ๋์ํ๋ ์ด์
2025๋
์ํธํํ ๊ท์ ํ๊ฒฝ์ ์์ํ๊ฐ ๊ธฐ์ ๋ง๋ ๋๋น์ด๋ถ์ ๋ฎ์๋ค. ์์ด๋ฐ๋๋ฅด๋ 2021๋
๋นํธ์ฝ์ธ์ ๋ฒ์ ํํ๋ก ์ฑํํ๋ค๊ฐ 2025๋
์ด IMF ํฉ์์ ๋ฐ๋ผ ์ด ์ ์ฑ
์ ์ฒ ํํ๊ณ , ์ค๊ตญ์ ๋ชจ๋ ์ํธํํ ๊ฑฐ๋๋ฅผ ๊ธ์งํ๋ค. EU๋ ์ํธ์์ฐ์์ฅ ๊ท์ ๋ฒ(MiCA)์ ์ํํ์ผ๋ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ ํฌ๊ด์ ์ธ ์
๋ฒ์ ํต๊ณผ์ํค๋ ๋ฐ ์ด๋ ค์์ ๊ฒช๊ณ ์๋ค. ์ธ๋๋ ์ํธํํ ์์ต์ 30%์ ์ธ๊ธ์ ๋ถ๊ณผํ๋ฉด์๋ ๊ทธ ๊ธฐ์ ์ ๋ฒ์ ์ง์๋ ๋ชจํธํ๊ฒ ์ ์งํ๊ณ ์๋ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ 130๊ฐ ์ด์์ ๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ค์ด ํ์ค์ํ ์ํธํํ์ ๋ํ ๊ตญ๊ฐ ํต์ ๋์์ผ๋ก ์ค์์ํ ๋์งํธํํ(CBDC)๋ฅผ ๊ฒํ ํ๊ณ ์๋ค.
์ด๋ฌํ ํํธํ๋ ์ฐ์ฐ์ด ์๋๋ค. ์ด๋ ์ํธํํ๊ฐ ๋ฌด์์ธ๊ฐโํํ, ์ํ, ์ฆ๊ถ, ์ฌ์ฐ๊ถ, ๋๋ ๊ธฐ์ ์ ์ธ๊ณต๋ฌผโ์ ๋ํ ์ง์ ํ ์๊ฒฌ ๋ถ์ผ์น๋ฅผ ๋ฐ์ํ๋ฉฐ, ๋ฐ๋ผ์ ์ด๋ค ๋ฒ์ ํ์ด ์ด๋ฅผ ๊ท์จํด์ผ ํ๋์ง์ ๋ํ ํฉ์๊ฐ ์ด๋ฃจ์ด์ง์ง ์์ ๊ฒ์ด๋ค. ๊ฐ๊ฐ์ ๋ถ๋ฅ๋ ์๋ก ๋ค๋ฅธ ๊ท์ ์ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ณ์ผ๋ฉฐ, ์์ง ์ด๋ ํ ํฉ์๋ ๋์ถ๋์ง ์์๋ค.
๊ณผ์ธ์ ๋์
Grijalva-Salazar, Caicedo-Mendoza, Zรบรฑiga-Castillo(2025)๋ 2020๋
๋ถํฐ 2025๋
๊น์ง์ ์ํธํํ ๊ณผ์ธ ๋ฐ ์ฌ์ ์ ์ฑ
์ ๋ํ ์ฒด๊ณ์ ๊ณ ์ฐฐ์ ์ ๊ณตํ๋ค. ๋์งํธ ์์ฐ์ด ์ ํต์ ์ธ ๊ท์ ์ฒด๊ณ ๋ฐ์ ์กด์ฌํจ์ ๋ฐ๋ผ ์ํธํํ์ ๋ํ ๊ณผ์ธ๋ ๊ธ๋ก๋ฒ ์ฌ์ ๊ฑฐ๋ฒ๋์ค์์ ์ ์ ๋ ์ค์ํด์ง๊ณ ์๋ค.
์ด ๊ณ ์ฐฐ์ ๋ช ๊ฐ์ง ์ง์์ ์ธ ๊ณผ์ ๋ฅผ ํ์
ํ๋ค.
- ๋ถ๋ฅ: ์ํธํํ ๊ฑฐ๋๋ ์๋ณธ์ด๋, ์๋, ๋ฌผ๋ฌผ๊ตํ, ์๋๋ฉด ํตํ ์ ํ์ ํด๋นํ๋๊ฐ? ์ด์ ๋ํ ๋ต๋ณ์ด ์ธ์จ๊ณผ ์ ๊ณ ์๋ฌด๋ฅผ ๊ฒฐ์ ํ๋ค.
- ์ถ์ ๊ฐ๋ฅ์ฑ: ํ์ค์ํ๋ ์ต๋ช
์ฑ ๊ฑฐ๋๋ ์ธ๋ฌด ๋น๊ตญ์ด ๋ชจ๋ํฐ๋งํ๊ธฐ ์ด๋ ต๋ค. ๋ธ๋ก์ฒด์ธ ๊ฑฐ๋๋ ์ด๋ก ์ ์ผ๋ก ํฌ๋ช
ํ์ง๋ง, ์ง๊ฐ ์ฃผ์๋ฅผ ๊ณผ์ธ ๋์ ๊ฐ์ธ๊ณผ ์ฐ๊ฒฐํ๋ ค๋ฉด ์์ฌ ์์์ด ํ์ํ๋ค.
- ๊ตญ๊ฒฝ ๊ฐ ์ฐจ์ต ๊ฑฐ๋: ์ํธํํ ๋ณด์ ์๋ ์ต์ํ์ ๋ง์ฐฐ๋ก ์ธ๊ธ ๊ฑฐ์ฃผ์ง๋ฅผ ๋ณ๊ฒฝํ๊ฑฐ๋ ์ ์ธ์จ ๊ดํ ๊ถ์ ํตํด ๊ฑฐ๋๋ฅผ ์ฐํํ ์ ์์ผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋ ์ ํต์ ์ธ ์ญ์ธ ๊ธ์ต๋ณด๋ค ๋ ์ ๊ทผํ๊ธฐ ์ฌ์ด ํํ์ ์กฐ์ธ ์ฐจ์ต ๊ฑฐ๋์ด๋ค.
- DeFi์ ๋ณต์ก์ฑ: ํ์ค์ํ ๊ธ์ต ํ๋กํ ์ฝ(์คํ
์ดํน, ์ด์ ๋์ฌ, ์ ๋์ฑ ๊ณต๊ธ)์ ๊ธฐ์กด ์ธ๊ธ ๋ฒ์ฃผ์ ๋ช
ํํ ๋ง์๋จ์ด์ง์ง ์๋ ์์ต์ ์ฐฝ์ถํ๋ค.
CBDC: ๊ตญ๊ฐ์ ๋ฐ๊ฒฉ
M.K.M., Aithal, S.K.R.S.(2024)๋ ๊ธ์ต ํฌ์ฉ์ฑ๊ณผ ์ง์ ๊ฐ๋ฅ์ฑ์ ๋ํ ์ค์์ํ ๋์งํธํํ(CBDC)์ ์ํฅ์ ๊ฒํ ํ๋ค. ์ฐ๊ตฌ ๋น์ 105๊ฐ ์ด์์ ๊ตญ๊ฐ๊ฐ CBDC๋ฅผ ๊ฒํ ํ๊ณ ์์์ผ๋ฉฐ, ๊ทธ ์ค ์ฝ 50๊ฐ๊ตญ์ด ๋์งํธํํ ๊ฐ๋ฐ์ ๊ณ ๊ธ ๋จ๊ณ์ ์์๋ค.
CBDC๋ ์ํธํํ์ ๋์ ์ ๋ํ ์ ๋์ ๋์์ ๋ํ๋ธ๋ค. ๋ฏผ๊ฐ ๋์งํธํํ๊ฐ ํํ ์ฃผ๊ถ์ ์ํํ๋ค๋ฉด, ๊ตญ๊ฐ๊ฐ ์์ฒด์ ์ธ ๋์งํธํํ๋ฅผ ๋ง๋ค๊ฒ ๋ค๋ ๊ฒ์ด๋ค. CBDC๋ ์ฃผ๊ถ ํตํ๋ฅผ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ์ผ๋ก ํ๋ฉฐ, ์ค์์ํ์ด ๋ฐํํ๊ณ ํตํ ์ ์ฑ
์ ์ํด ๊ด๋ฆฌ๋จ์ผ๋ก์จ ๋์งํธ ๊ฒฐ์ ์ ๊ธฐ์ ์ ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ ์ฑํํ๋ฉด์๋ ๊ธ์ต ์์คํ
์์ ๊ตญ๊ฐ์ ์ญํ ์ ๋ณด์กดํ๋ค.
CBDC์ ๊ธ์ต ํฌ์ฉ์ฑ ๋
ผ๊ฑฐ๋ ๊ฐ๋ฐ๋์๊ตญ์์ ์ค๋๋ ฅ์ด ์๋ค. ํด๋ํฐ์ ํตํด ์ ๊ทผ ๊ฐ๋ฅํ ๊ตญ๊ฐ ๋ฐํ ๋์งํธํํ๋ ์ ํต์ ์ธ ๊ธ์ต ์ธํ๋ผ์ ์ ๊ทผํ์ง ๋ชปํ๋ ๋น์ํ ์ธ๊ตฌ์๊ฒ ๋๋ฌํ ์ ์๋ค. ์ธ๋์ ๋์งํธ ๋ฃจํผ ํ์ผ๋ฟ, ์ค๊ตญ์ ๋์งํธ ์์ ๋ฐฐํฌ, ๋์ด์ง๋ฆฌ์์ eNaira๋ ๋ชจ๋ ๊ธ์ต ํฌ์ฉ์ฑ์ ์ฃผ์ ๋ชฉํ๋ก ์ผ๊ณ ์๋ค.
๋ชฝ๊ณจ: ๋์งํธ ์๋์ "๋ฒ์ ํํ" ์ ์
Siilen(2025)์ ๊ทผ๋ณธ์ ์ธ ๋ฒ์ ์ง๋ฌธ์ ๊ฒํ ํ๋ค. ํํ๊ฐ ๋์งํธ์ผ ๋ "๋ฒ์ ํํ"๋ ๋ฌด์์ ์๋ฏธํ๋๊ฐ? ์ํธํํ์ ์ ์์ง๊ฐ๊ณผ ๊ฐ์ ๋์งํธ ๊ฒฐ์ ์๋จ์ ๊ธ์ํ ๋ฐ์ ์ ๋์ํ์ฌ, ์ ์ธ๊ณ ์ค์์ํ๋ค์ ๊ตญ๊ฐ ํตํ๋ฅผ ๋ณดํธํ๊ณ ๊ธ์ต ์์ ์ฑ์ ํ๋ณดํ ๋ชฉ์ ์ผ๋ก ์์ฒด ๋์งํธํํ ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์์ํ๋ค.
๋ชฝ๊ณจ ์ฌ๋ก๋ ์๊ท๋ชจ ๊ฐ๋ฐฉ ๊ฒฝ์ ๊ฐ ๋์งํธ ํํ ํ์ ๊ณผ ํํ ์ฃผ๊ถ ์ฌ์ด์ ๊ธด์ฅ์ ์ด๋ป๊ฒ ํค์ณ๋๊ฐ๋์ง๋ฅผ ๋ณด์ฌ์ค๋ค. ๋ชฝ๊ณจ์ ๋ฒ์ ํ๋ ์์ํฌ๋ ๋๋ถ๋ถ์ ๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ค๊ณผ ๋ง์ฐฌ๊ฐ์ง๋ก ๋ฒ์ ํตํ๋ฅผ ์ค๋ฌผ ํํ์ ๊ด์ ์์ ์ ์ํ๊ณ ์๋ค. CBDC์ ๋ฒ์ ํตํ ์ง์๋ฅผ ๋ถ์ฌํ๋ ค๋ฉด ํตํ๋ฒ๋ฟ๋ง ์๋๋ผ ๊ณ์ฝ๋ฒ, ์ธ๋ฒ, ์๋น์๋ณดํธ๋ฒ์๋ ์ํฅ์ ๋ฏธ์น๋ ์
๋ฒ์ ๋ณ๊ฒฝ์ด ํ์ํ๋ค.
Pakistan: ํ๊ธ์์ ์ฝ๋๋ก
Amjad(2026)๋ Pakistan์ ๊ธฐ์กด ๋ฒ๋ฅ ์ด ๋ฏธ๋์ Digital Rupee ๋๋ CBDC๋ฅผ ์ง์ํ ์ ์๋์ง๋ฅผ ํ๊ฐํ๋ค. Pakistan์ ํ๊ธ ์ค์ฌ ๊ฒฝ์ ๋ ํํ
ํฌ ์ฑ์ฅ๊ณผ State Bank of Pakistan์ Raast ์ฆ์๊ฒฐ์ ์์คํ
์ ํ์
์ด ๋น ๋ฅด๊ฒ ๋์งํธ ๊ธ์ต์ผ๋ก ์ ํํ๊ณ ์๋ค.
์ด ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ ๊ณต์ ์ํ ๋ณด๊ธ๋ฅ ์ด ๋ฎ๊ณ , ํด๋ํฐ ๋ณด๊ธ๋ฅ ์ด ๋์ผ๋ฉฐ, ๋น๊ณต์ ๊ฒฝ์ ๊ฐ ๊ฒฝ์ ํ๋์ ์๋น ๋ถ๋ถ์ ์ฐจ์งํ๋ ๊ตญ๊ฐ์์ ๋์งํธ ํํ๋ฅผ ์ํ ๋ฒ์ ์ธํ๋ผ๋ฅผ ํ๊ฐํ๋ค. ๋์งํธ ์ผ๋ง๊ณผ ๋ฒ์ ์ธํ๋ผ ์ฌ์ด์ ๊ฐ๊ทน์ ์๋นํ๋ค. Pakistan์ ์ง๊ธ๊ฒฐ์ ์์คํ
๋ฒ๋ฅ , ์ํ ๊ท์ , ์ธ๋ฒ์ ํ๊ธ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ ๊ฒฝ์ ๋ฅผ ์ํด ์ค๊ณ๋์์ผ๋ฉฐ, ๋์งํธ ํํ๋ฅผ ์์ฉํ๊ธฐ ์ํด์๋ ํฌ๊ด์ ์ธ ๊ฐํธ์ด ํ์ํ๋ค.
๊ท์ ์ ํ์์ฑ
Sardar์ Sood(2024)๋ ์ํธํํ ๊ท์ ๊ฐ ์ ์ฑ
์ ์ ํ์ด ์๋ ์๊ธํ ํ์๋ผ๊ณ ์ฃผ์ฅํ๋ค. ์๋ง์ ๊ธฐ์ ํ๋ช
๊ฐ์ด๋ฐ ํํ ์ญ์ ํ๋ช
์ ๋ง์ดํ์ฌ ๋์งํธ ํํ๊ฐ ํ์ํ์๋ค. ๊ฐ์ํํ์ ์ธ๊ธฐ์ ์ฌ์ฉ์ด ์ฆ๊ฐํจ์ ๋ฐ๋ผ ๊ท์ ๋ฌธ์ ๋ ์ ์ ๋ ์๊ธํด์ง๊ณ ์๋ค.
์ด ๋
ผ๋ฌธ์ ์ ๋ฉด ๊ธ์ง(์ค๊ตญ, ์์ ๋ฆฌ, ๋ฐฉ๊ธ๋ผ๋ฐ์)๋ถํฐ ์ ํ์ ํ์ฉ(์ธ๋, ๋ฌ์์), ์์ ํ ํตํฉ(์ค์์ค; El Salvador๋ 2021~2025๋
๋์ Bitcoin์ ๋ฒ์ ํตํ๋ก ์ฑํ)์ ์ด๋ฅด๊ธฐ๊น์ง ์ ์ธ๊ณ์ ์ธ ๊ท์ ์ ๊ทผ๋ฒ์ ๊ฒํ ํ๋ค. ๋ถ์ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ๊ท์ ์ ๊ทผ๋ฒ์ ๊ธฐ์ ์ ์ค๋น๋๋ ๊ธ์ต ๋ฐ์ ์์ค๋ณด๋ค ์ ์น ์ฒด์ ์ ํ ๋ฐ ๊ฒฝ์ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์ ๋ ๋์ ์๊ด๊ด๊ณ๋ฅผ ๋ณด์๋ค. ์ด๋ ์ํธํํ ๊ท์ ๊ฐ ๊ธฐ์ ์ ๋ฌธ์ ์ธ ๋งํผ์ด๋ ์ ์น์ ์ ํ์์ ์์ฌํ๋ค.
์ฃผ์ฅ๊ณผ ๊ทผ๊ฑฐ
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| ์ฃผ์ฅ | ๊ทผ๊ฑฐ | ํ์ |
|---|
| ์ ์ธ๊ณ ์ํธํํ ๊ณผ์ธ๋ ํ์ค์ ํฅํด ์๋ ดํ๊ณ ์๋ค | Grijalva-Salazar et al.(2025): ๋ถ๋ฅ, ์ถ์ ๊ฐ๋ฅ์ฑ, ๊ตญ๊ฒฝ ๊ฐ ๊ณผ์ธ ๋ฌธ์ ๊ฐ ์ง์๋จ | โ ๋ฐ๋ฐ๋จ |
| CBDC๋ ๊ฐ๋ฐ๋์๊ตญ์ ๊ธ์ต ํฌ์ฉ์ ์ด์งํ ์ ์๋ค | M.K.M. et al.(2024): ๋ชจ๋ฐ์ผ๋ก ์ ๊ทผ ๊ฐ๋ฅํ ๋์งํธ ํํ๋ ์ํ ๋ฏธ๊ฑฐ๋ ์ธ๊ตฌ์ ๋๋ฌํ ์ ์์ | โ
์ง์ง๋จ (์์น์ ์ผ๋ก) |
| ๊ธฐ์กด ๋ฒ์ ํ๋ ์์ํฌ๋ ๋์งํธ ํํ๋ฅผ ์์ฉํ ์ ์๋ค | Siilen(2025), Amjad(2026): "๋ฒ์ ํตํ"์ ๋ฒ์ ์ ์๋ ์
๋ฒ์ ๊ฐ์ ์ด ํ์ํจ | โ ๋ฐ๋ฐ๋จ |
| ์ํธํํ ๊ท์ ๋ ์ฃผ๋ก ๊ธฐ์ ์ ๊ณผ์ ์ด๋ค | Sardar & Sood(2024): ๊ท์ ์ ๊ทผ๋ฒ์ ์ ์น ์ฒด์ ๋ฐ ๊ฒฝ์ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์ ์๊ด๊ด๊ณ๋ฅผ ๋ณด์ | โ ๋ฐ๋ฐ๋จ (์ฃผ๋ก ์ ์น์ ) |
๋ฏธํด๊ฒฐ ์ง๋ฌธ
CBDC์ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ ์ํธํํ๋ ๊ณต์กดํ ์ ์๋๊ฐ? CBDC๋ ๊ตญ๊ฐ ํต์ ๋ฅผ ์ ๊ณตํ๊ณ , ์ํธํํ๋ ํ์ค์ํ๋ฅผ ์ ๊ณตํ๋ค. ์ด ๋์ ๋์งํธ ํํ์ ๋ํ ์ํธ๋ณด์์ ๋น์ ์ธ๊ฐ, ์๋๋ฉด ๊ฒฝ์์ ๋น์ ์ธ๊ฐ?DeFi ํ๋กํ ์ฝ์ ์ด๋ป๊ฒ ๊ท์ ๋์ด์ผ ํ๋๊ฐ? ๋ฒ์ ์ค์ฒด๋, ์ง๋ฆฌ์ ์์น๋, ์๋ณ ๊ฐ๋ฅํ ์ด์์๋ ์๋ ํ์ค์ํ ์์จ ์กฐ์ง(DAO)์ ๊ธ์ต ๊ท์ ์ ๋ชจ๋ ์ ์ ์ ๋์ ํ๋ค.์ํธํํ ๊ท์ ๋ ๋ถ์ด๋ ๊ฒ์ธ๊ฐ, ์๋๋ฉด ์๋ ด๋ ๊ฒ์ธ๊ฐ? EU์ MiCA๋ ๋ค๋ฅธ ๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ค์ ์ํฅ์ ๋ฏธ์น ์ ์๋ ํฌ๊ด์ ์ธ ํ๋ ์์ํฌ๋ฅผ ์ ๊ณตํ๋ค. ๊ทธ๋ฌ๋ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ, ์ค๊ตญ, ์ธ๋๋ ๊ฐ๊ธฐ ๋ค๋ฅธ ๊ธธ์ ๊ฑท๊ณ ์๋ค.CBDC์ ํ๋ผ์ด๋ฒ์ ํจ์๋ ๋ฌด์์ธ๊ฐ? ํ๊ธ(์ต๋ช
์ฑ์ ์ง๋)๊ณผ ๋ฌ๋ฆฌ CBDC๋ ๋ชจ๋ ๊ฑฐ๋์ ๋ํ ๊ตญ๊ฐ ๊ฐ์๋ฅผ ๊ฐ๋ฅํ๊ฒ ํ๋ค. CBDC ์ํคํ
์ฒ์ ํ๋ผ์ด๋ฒ์ ๋ณดํธ๋ฅผ ์ด๋ป๊ฒ ์ค๊ณํด์ผ ํ๋๊ฐ?ํจ์
References (5)
[1] Grijalva-Salazar, R.V., Caicedo-Mendoza, J.A., & Zรบรฑiga-Castillo, A.J. (2025). Bridging Regulation and Innovation: A Systematic Review of Cryptocurrency Taxation. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 18(12), 720.
[2] M.K.M., P.S.A., & S.K.R.S. (2024). Impact of Centralized Blockchain Digital Currency (CBDC): For Financial Inclusion and Sustainability. International Journal of Management, Technology and Social Sciences, 9(2), 351.
[3] Siilen, R. (2025). Legal Foundations of Central Bank Digital Currency: Defining Mongolia's Legal Framework. National Law Review, 2025(1), 04.
[4] Amjad, B. (2026). From Cash to Code: Examining the Legal Framework for the Future of Digital Currency in Pakistan. ICPP, 07.
[5] Sardar, H.H. & Sood, C. (2024). Cryptocurrency Regulation: Need of the Hour. GLS KALP, 2(1), 23.